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1 THE BUNGEAN SOLUTION
More than any other philosopher, Mario Bunge is unclassifiable. In 1982
John Wettersten wrote about the discomfort and frustration that one
might feel when reading Bunge’s work. He was trying to understand why
his work was not seen as an alternative to the work of other philosophers1.
Wettersten's answer relates to the problem of knowledge acquisition. If
knowledge is contextual, relative to a frame of thought, how can we then
rationally evaluate this frame of thought itself? Wettersten identifies two
tendencies: either one maintains that frames of thought are chosen arbi-
trarily, which leads to relativism, or one maintains that there is only one
immutable frame of thought, which leads to dogmatism.
Like many thinkers, Bunge tries to avoid relativism and dogmatism.
But Bunge's proposed solution would cause this unease that Wettersten
reports. Bunge's solution is to take for granted a set of general assump-
tions associated with science. By adopting a framework similar to that of
1 Wettersten, « The Place of Mario Bunge », 1982.
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science, it is then possible to make rigorous analyses and synthesizes
within this framework, but still sensitive to the change that this general
framework undergoes under the influence of scientific research. But is this
frame of thought not chosen arbitrarily? It is not chosen arbitrarily, but it
cannot be justified in a "strong", logical, philosophical, metaphysical or
other way, which would lead us to dogmatism. It only takes a thought ex-
periment, a reflection, to convince oneself that objects of knowledge are
concrete objects that provoke our sensations and our perception. If we con-
tinue our reflection, we will see that these objects have their own qualities,
what thinkers have called primary qualities, and that we wrongly attrib-
ute certain qualities that they do not have, called secondary qualities.
Once this general premise has been admitted, it is easy to recognize that
science provides us with a fairly accurate, although imperfect, account as
to the nature of these concrete objects. In fact, the very success of science
becomes part of our thinking. There is a back and forth between our re-
flections on the subject and this observation of the success of science. This
success reinforces the idea that we are in concrete interaction with objects
from the "outside world" and that it is these objects that are objects of
knowledge. It is therefore rational to adopt the general postulates on
which science is based, to adopt Bunge's solution to the problem of
knowledge acquisition, and thus avoid the pitfalls, mentioned by Wetter-
sten, which are dogmatism and relativism, in order to build a general sci-
entific discourse, a metascience.
Why metascience? Why a new discipline? The general assumptions on
which science is based are not philosophical, despite the fact that it is com-
mon to say otherwise. They are not philosophical because they come from
a pre-methodical reflection. There is no method, be it philosophical, scien-
tific or metascientific, that allows us to establish them. The thought ex-
periment that distinguishes primary qualities from secondary qualities
requires no advanced training in philosophy or science. Just use our abil-
ity to think. Furthermore, the philosophical doctrines themselves are
based on a set of pre-methodical postulates. It is only once these postulates
have been established that one can set in motion a particular philosophi-
cal method specific to each doctrine. Thus, thinking about primary quali-
ties and secondary qualities is part of the more general problem of distin-
guishing between appearance and reality. What is an appearance? What
is reality? As several thinkers have pointed out, the division of philosophy
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into doctrines comes in large part from the answers proposed to these
questions. But answers advanced by each doctrine do not come from a
philosophical method. Before even starting research, you must have at
least a basic idea of the object of knowledge. In other words, you have to
get an idea of the nature of appearances and reality before proposing an
approach and methods to account for it. The existence of pre-methodical,
non-philosophical and non-scientific postulates justifies a metascience in-
sofar as it relies on the same general postulates as science. These postu-
lates are not problematized even if they can be criticized and adjusted ac-
cording to the advancement of science. This is what we defend in our
contribution "Metascience: for a general scientific discourse" in this first
issue of Mεtascience entitled Mario Bunge, Thinker of Materiality.
Why materiality? Why not materialism? Philosophical doctrines are
normally referred to by words ending with suffixes -ism or -logy. Bunge
also uses an impressive number of -isms to qualify his thinking. We argue
that Bunge's positions are not philosophical, but rather the result of a pre-
methodical reflection, and the fact that they are not problematized, but
rather taken for granted, takes him away from philosophy. Thus, simul-
taneously supporting general postulates similar to those of science evacu-
ates philosophical discourse and brings Bunge's way of reasoning closer to
the way scientists reason. Bunge adopts a scientific posture, not a philo-
sophical one. Now, if the research program we are proposing is based on
the same postulates as science, and if every metasciences share the same
objects, problems and methods, it would no longer be necessary to use any
-isms since metasciences will then form a unified disciplinary field in the
same way as factual and formal sciences form unified disciplinary fields.
"Isms" are necessary where doctrines exist, and doctrines proliferate
where there are no common objects, problems and methods. Factual and
formal sciences use very few expressions in -ism to designate doctrines. If
scientists were to focus on defining doctrines whenever they did not im-
mediately agree on a solution to a problem, they would indeed produce a
large amount of -isms. However, they prefer to examine solutions already
available, propose new solutions and test those solutions. This is only pos-
sible because they share a common approach, because they agree on the
objects and problems to be studied and on methods to be used, even if it is
still possible to re-evaluate objects, problems and methods. Thus, metasci-
ences should produce very few -isms, starting with materialism. It is
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useless to maintain a "materialism" in order to oppose it to an "idealism",
an "immaterialism" or a "spiritualism". Matter is the object of direct study
of science and indirectly that of metascience. Bunge constructs a general
scientific discourse, metascientific theories, based on the general postu-
lates of science, including that of taking for granted the existence of a
unique and concrete world. Science provides the results needed to study
matter in general. There cannot therefore be several materialisms since
our general conception of matter comes from a single source, science,
which is interested in physical, chemical, living and thinking matter.
Hence the interest in physical, chemical, biological, psychological and so-
ciological materiality, and not in materialism.
We are aware that there are many thinkers who implicitly or explicitly
adopt a scientific attitude and, therefore, that they support a set of as-
sumptions similar to those Bunge adopts and which is generally at-
tributed to science. This is the first objective that the Society for the Pro-
gress of Metasciences must set itself, that of reaching all these thinkers,
scientists or philosophers, who are already adopting the Bunge alterna-
tive.
2 THE ROLE OF SOPROMET AND MΕTASCIENCE
Why the epsilon in Mεtascience? It was important to stand out from the
journal Metascience, published by Springer, in association with the Aus-
tralasian Association for the History, Philosophy and Social Studies of Sci-
ence (AAHPSSS). It had to stand out not only for the name, but above all
because the purpose, scope and intended audience of the two journals are
entirely different. Metascience specializes in book reviews, hence its sub-
title, An International Review Journal for the History, Philosophy and So-
cial Studies of Science. It covers all fields or disciplines which are inter-
ested in science, as its subtitle clearly indicates, whether it be philosophy,
sociology or the history of science. The journal claims to be non-specialized
because it is intended to be accessible to all researchers in these fields or
disciplines.
As for Mεtascience, it specializes in the conceptual study of science with
a view to producing a scientific general discourse, this expression then
serving as a subtitle for the journal. It is a specialized journal, in the sense
that it proposes to found a new discipline, metascience, and that it is
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addressed to all those interested in the nature of scientific products—con-
cepts, propositions, theories—outside their social context, in the same way
that one can be interested in a literary or artistic work for itself. The study
of science, however, cannot be reduced to a logical analysis of it; logic is
only a tool for the scientist and the metascientist and not an approach or
a method. The nature of scientific production can only be grasped if there
is a metascientific theorization, that is to say the elaboration of ontologi-
cal, semantic, epistemological and methodological theories, theories
whose starting point is intended to be identical to that of science: a set of
general postulates in the world and on knowledge of it. We owe this ap-
proach to the study of science to Mario Bunge.
What tools and resources are available to us to continue Mario Bunge’s
research program? To our knowledge, there is none. We have therefore
created the Society for the Progress of Metasciences (Sopromet), a
non-profit association dedicated to the promotion of the conceptual sci-
ences or metascience in order to produce a scientific general discourse.
Founded in 2018, Sopromet is a non-institutional initiative that receives
no subsidy. Here are some of the goals that Sopromet has set for fulfilling
its mission:
1. Supporting a meta-scientific research program
2. Building a community of metascientists
3. Promoting the professionalization of metascientific research
4. Promoting the creation of departments of metasciences
5. Organizing an annual congress
6. Creating a metascientific lexicon
7. Dissemination of metascientific research to a wide audience
8. Demystifying philosophy
9. Distinguishing the metascientific approach from the philosoph-
ical approach
Mεtascience will act as a catalyst and hopefully help achieve Sopromet’s
goals. The journal claims Bunge’s work. The claim is not for the purpose
of exegesis, but rather with the aim of continuing the research program
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developed by the author of the Treatise on Basic Philosophy2. The Treatise
is the culmination of some twenty-five years of research and reflection on
the nature of science, but also on the nature of philosophical research. The
Treatise had and still exerts a great influence on several thinkers. In 1990,
he was the subject of a collective study, Studies on Mario Bunge’s Treatise,
under the direction of Paul Weingartner and Georg J.W. Dorn. This study
involved thinkers from various backgrounds, philosophers, but also scien-
tists. It would be futile to seek to associate the Treatise, or Bunge’s work,
with a philosophical current. Bunge’s thought was associated with ana-
lytic philosophy or logical empiricism, but even a cursory reading of
Bunge’s work makes us see the gap between Bunge’s approach and that
of these philosophical doctrines. We have already noticed that Bunge’s sci-
entific approach, adopting the general assumptions of science and not
problematizing them, makes the Treatise unclassifiable within philoso-
phy, that the Treastise alone is the foundation of a metascientific research
program, the founding work of a new branch of scientific knowledge, meta-
science or the conceptual sciences, thus forming a scientific triad with the
factual sciences and the formal sciences.
Without the assistance of Éditions Matériologiques, the journal
would only be available in electronic format; the availability of a journal
in paper format is also an asset for the dissemination of knowledge. The
EM was ideally suited to participate in this project since they specialize
in the publication of works of science and philosophy of science, and they
have also published the translation of two works by Bunge, Philosophy of
Medicine and Between Two Worlds.
Although the tools are lacking, Sopromet and Mεtascience did not
emerge in a cultural vacuum. Over the centuries, several philosophers
have contributed to metascience, just as many of them have contributed
to science. We can add to the objectives that Sopromet has set to itself,
that of identifying the metascientific contribution of these thinkers, a
work already well advanced thanks to Mario Bunge. Closer to home, there
are thinkers and projects close in spirit to that of Sopromet. We are think-
ing, among other things, of the series “Sciences & Philosophie” at Éditions
Matériauxologiques (https://materiologiques.com/fr/12-sciences-
philosophie-2275-9948), directed by Philippe Huneman, Guillaume
2 Bunge, Treatise on Basic Philosophy, 1974-1989.
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Lecointre and Marc Silberstein, to Max Kistler’s project, Metascience of
Science/Métaphysique des sciences (https://metascience.hypotheses.org),
that of Tuomas Tahko in Bristol, MetaScience
(https://metascience.xyz/the-project), and an organized conference by
Zongrong Li, Developing Mario Bunge’s Scientific Philosophical Program,
for 2021 (for more information, 2320129239@qq.com). We also think of
thinkers such as Elliott Sober, in philosophy of biology, or Gustavo
Romero, in philosophy of physics, whose research for us is more about
metascience than philosophy. Without going into details—which we re-
serve for our article "Metascience: for a general scientific discourse"—a
thinker is a metascientist if he does not postulate any principle foreign to
matter, which is the subject of study of all sciences.
The first objective of Mεtascience is to attract authors who will make
an original contribution to metascience, notably through the development
of semantic, ontological, epistemological and methodological theories,
these disciplines being treated metascientifically rather than philosophi-
cally. That said, metascience is practiced in many ways, as is science. Alt-
hough the development of very general theories is the ultimate in re-
search, most scientists do not conceive of such theories and most
metascientists will not conceive far-reaching ontology, semantics, episte-
mology and methodology. A contribution may be the development of a
more restricted theory, such as a theory of factual truth that would be
integrated into a general semantics. It can also be a work of clarifying a
concept, by a characterization or definition, or a theory, which can then
take the form of a bungean axiomatization (dual axiomatics), one of the
most remarkable contributions of Mario Bunge3. We can also think of the
work of validating metascientific theories, whether by confronting them
with contemporary scientific theories in all fields or by case studies from
the history of science. An important application of metascientific theories
would be the ontological, semantic, epistemological and methodological
analysis of academic pseudosciences, notably doctrines in the social sci-
ences based on the rational choice “theory”, in order to pinpoint precisely
the unscientific assumptions on which they are based. If there is valida-
tion, there is data collection. There is therefore work to excavate, to
3 The expression dual axiomatics appears in two texts by Bunge  : « Why Axiomatize ? », 2016,
and Doing Science, 2017, sect. 5.4. For examples of dual axiomatization, see Foundations of Phys-
ics, 1967.
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catalogue and to classify metascientific data. This metascientific
knowledge must be taught and passed on to students, disseminated to a
wide audience. One imagines then the writing of textbooks and popular
works, in which an important place would be reserved to the notion reflec-
tion and various transempirical thought experiments. Finally, there is the
application of this knowledge to many situations, wherever it is relevant
to use a general science-based thought. As can be seen, metascientific re-
search is diverse and of varying difficulty. There is something for all tastes
and talents. And we just hovered over the subject!
This inaugural issue of Mεtascience is also a special issue since it is
dedicated to paying homage to Mario Bunge. Originally, it was a question
of taking advantage of the occasion of its 100 years to underline its contri-
bution to knowledge, but also to mark the affiliation that we claim with
its thought. The death of Mario Bunge in early 2020, unfortunately,
obliges us to pay him a posthumous tribute. We have therefore not im-
posed the editorial policy of Mεtascience on the contributors to this issue
so that they can contribute to this tribute each in their own way. Never-
theless, many of the articles on this issue can be considered as metascien-
tific contributions, or of metascientific inspiration, or as applications of
the metascientific approach to various fields.
Next issues will therefore be more and more oriented towards the meta-
scientific research program that we are proposing. The Bungean approach
to general knowledge is the only one of its kind, at least in such an
achieved form, so it is normal that there is some uncertainty as to the
details of the research program, in particular the criteria for text evalua-
tion. This is not specific to the conceptual sciences, but also affects the
factual and formal sciences; scientific criteria are refined and clarified
over time, although the general scientific approach remains the same.
We will edit the second issue of Mεtascience, but we hope that future
members of Sopromet will volunteer to edit subsequent issues. We will
need the help of collaborators to assess both the metascientific and scien-
tific aspects of the articles. Membership of Sopromet will therefore be pos-
sible in a few months when a transactional page is put online on the So-
promet’s website.
François Maurice – Presentation. Mεtascience and the Bunge Alternative ï9
Mεtascience | No. 1 | Mario Bunge : Thinker of Materiality
3 AND FOR THE LITTLE STORY
In the spring of 2016, I was looking for a publisher for my translation of
this little gem written by Mario Bunge that is the Philosophical Diction-
ary4, at once irreverent, daring and serious. It didn’t take long to find the
Éditions Matériologiques and its publisher Marc Silberstein, whose name
was familiar to me since he had published a translation of Scientific Ma-
terialism5 from Mario Bunge while he was editor of the series “Maté-
riologique” at the Éditions Syllepse. The project was accepted immediately
because “the Dictionary is one of our favorite MB books” and that two
other Bunge’s books were being translated at the time6. I understood then
that I had stumbled upon the den of the bungeans in France.
In the spring 2017, Marc Silberstein asked me to participate in the col-
lective Qu’est-ce que la science… pour vous ?7 (What is Science… to You?)
I brought out on this occasion the ideas of scientific triad, scientific general
discourse and conceptual sciences. On the other hand, although the text
was very critical of philosophy, I still used the concept of scientific philos-
ophy instead of that of metascience.
I learned from Marc Silberstein in the summer of 2018 that Springer
would publish a collective in English in 2019 in tribute to Mario Bunge for
his 100th birthday8. He planned to participate in this tribute by the sim-
ultaneous publication of my translation of Philosophical Dictionary and
that of Pierre Deleporte of Medical Philosophy: “It will be the small con-
tribution of French speakers to this event dear to our hearts.” It didn’t
take more to tell Marc Silberstein that French speakers could do a little
more.
For some time now, I have been considering the idea of creating an
association to support a research program inspired by the work of Mario
Bunge. I planned to found the association and launch its journal in 2021
or 2022. Now that I knew that Springer was organizing a “writing festi-
val”, a festschrift, I could not miss the opportunity to participate in the
4 Bunge, Philosophical Dictionary, 2003.
5 Bunge, Le matérialisme scientifique, 2008 [1981].
6  Bunge, Philosophie de la médecine, 2019 [2013], Bunge, Dictionnaire philosophique, 2020
[2003].
7 Silberstein, Qu’est-ce que la science... pour vous ?, 2017.
8 Matthews, Mario Bunge : A Centenary Festschrift, 2019.
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festivities. So I announced to Marc Silberstein the creation of the Society
for the Progress of Metascience, whose first issue of his journal, Mεtasci-
ence, would pay tribute to Mario Bunge. At the time, I was only consider-
ing publishing in electronic format. In turn, Marc Silberstein takes the
ball and run with it and offered to publish a paper version of the journal.
The Society for the Progress of Metascience and its journal Mεtascience
were founded in the summer of 2018. So it was between spring 2017 and
spring 2018 that I completely broke away from philosophy. So it took me
almost 25 years to cut all ties with philosophy, one by one, whereas I had
always associated philosophy with rational discourse and science! The
three key moments of this journey were the equating of philosophy with
secular theology by a friend, the discovery of the Philosophical Dictionary,
and the invitation of Marc Silberstein to write a text for Qu’est-ce que la
science… pour vous? The idea that philosophy is a secular theology al-
lowed me to glimpse the notion of general discourse, that philosophy is
only one general discourse among others. The discovery of Mario Bunge’s
work exposed me to a discourse that seemed less and less philosophical
and more and more scientific as I dived into it. The writing of Une triade
scientifique?9 at the invitation of Marc Silberstein, gave me the oppor-
tunity to develop the notions of scientific triad, general scientific dis-
course, and conceptual sciences, but not yet of metascience, which will not
become clear until a few months later. Each, in their own way, triggered
a process of reflection, a synaptic chain reaction.
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